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Abstract
The current outbreak of Ebola virus disease in West Africa is the worst so far.• The unprecedented extent of
mortality and morbidity in this outbreak has followed more from imposition of neoliberal economic policies
on the countries affected than from the biological virulence of Ebola virus. • The lack of vaccines and
medications for Ebola virus disease is evidence that markets cannot reliably supply treatments for epidemic
diseases.• We attribute the current difficulties in containmentchiefl y to the erosion or non-development of
the health and medical infrastructure needed to respond effectively, as a direct result of market-privileging
policies imposed in the interests of wealthy nations.• These events and responses hold lessons for public
health priorities in Australia.
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Don’t be scared, be angry: the politics and 
ethics of Ebola
Summary
  The current outbreak of Ebola virus disease in West 
Africa is the worst so far. 
  The unprecedented extent of mortality and morbidity 
in this outbreak has followed more from imposition of 
neoliberal economic policies on the countries aff ected 
than from the biological virulence of Ebola virus.
  The lack of vaccines and medications for Ebola virus 
disease is evidence that markets cannot reliably supply 
treatments for epidemic diseases.
  We attribute the current diffi  culties in containment 
chiefl y to the erosion or non-development of the 
health and medical infrastructure needed to respond 
eff ectively, as a direct result of market-privileging 
policies imposed in the interests of wealthy nations.
  These events and responses hold lessons for public 
health priorities in Australia.
T
he current outbreak of Ebola virus disease (EVD) 
in West Africa is the worst so far. As of 20 August 
2014, 2240 confi rmed cases and 1229 deaths have 
been recorded by the World Health Organization.1 
While the possibility of an EVD outbreak in Australia 
should not worry us,2 the social, economic and political 
conditions associated with the present outbreak should. 
EVD has been characterised as an African disease spread 
through African culture.3 However, we argue that many 
aspects of this outbreak represent a continuation of crises 
whose root cause lies in neoliberal economic policies 
that emphasise the free market as the primary driver of 
economic growth, innovation and allocation of resources.4
Two aspects of the outbreak and the way in which it 
has been managed support this contention. First, the lack 
of vaccines and medications for EVD is evidence that 
markets cannot reliably supply treatments for epidemic 
diseases where the number of affected individuals is 
small. Second, the public infrastructure needed to pre-
vent and control an infectious disease outbreak has been 
eroded in many West African nations over the past 40 
years. Alongside war, political instability and corruption, 
the collapse of social infrastructure has resulted from 
structural adjustment and trade liberalisation programs 
promoted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
the World Bank. We need to understand these political 
and economic problems as the conditions underlying 
disease outbreaks.5
Therapeutic innovation has not trickled down
Since EVD was identifi ed almost 40 years ago, the scien-
tifi c community has been able to accelerate research and 
develop prevention and containment strategies for other 
worrying emerging infectious diseases, such as those 
caused by severe acute respiratory syndrome corona-
virus,6 infl uenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus and Hendra virus. 
So why has this not occurred with Ebola?
Part of the reason is that the normal drivers of drug 
research and development — pharmaceutical companies 
operating in a global marketplace — have failed to de-
velop effective treatments or vaccines for highly virulent 
and destructive diseases affecting only small numbers 
of very poor people in sporadic outbreaks. Researchers, 
investors and company directors may recognise hu-
manitarian needs but cannot tolerate the economic risks. 
Instead, pharmaceutical companies focus on conditions 
or diseases that involve large markets involving more 
affl uent and regular consumers of their products, where 
larger profi ts can be generated.7
Nevertheless, despite the economic disincentives, sev-
eral small companies have been developing drugs and 
vaccines against EVD. There are products in pretrial 
readiness, and Phase II clinical trials for promising EVD 
therapies are expected soon and may have benefi t in this 
outbreak.8,9 However, it seems that these developments 
are not motivated primarily by humanitarian considera-
tions — to save African lives — but rather by the desire to 
safeguard Western nations against emerging infectious 
diseases and weaponised infectious agents.10,11
Therapeutic innovation is part of a security 
agenda
Established by the United States Government after the an-
thrax attacks of 2001, the Biomedical Advanced Research 
and Development Authority (BARDA) has stockpiled vast 
quantities of therapeutic agents in readiness for various 
forms of perceived biological threat to US citizens. BARDA 
and the US military medical services, in partnership 
with hundreds of small biotechnology companies, have 
developed medical countermeasures against infectious 
agents with potential for use in terrorist or military ac-
tivity. Three of the agents funded by these partnerships 
are in the early stages of development as countermeas-
ures against EVD. Research into ZMapp, the monoclonal 
antibody therapy given experimentally to a very small 
number of infected people in the current outbreak, was 
funded by the US Army Medical Research Institute of 
Infectious Diseases and Public Health Agency of Canada7 
as part of this biodefence program. In Australia, the 
CSIRO (Commonwealth Scientifi c and Industrial Research 
Organisation) and US military medical services collabo-
rated to produce the Hendra virus antiserum and related 
equine vaccine.12
These partnerships refl ect a worldwide shift of public 
health focus from disease prevention towards the bio-
security of wealthy nations, their preparedness for disease 
outbreaks and protection of their economic interests. 
Lakoff describes two complementary regimes of global 
health: one focused on security systems that mitigate 
threats to Western countries, and one focused on hu-
manitarian disease control in the developing world, with 
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the second regime functioning as a palliation against the 
fi rst.13 Wealthy nations’ stockpiling of medicines in the 
face of any threat, and the production costs of sophisti-
cated therapies such as ZMapp,5,7,8 lessen the availability 
of such medicines to people in impoverished nations. The 
effect is to reinforce a division between a small, privil-
eged group of wealthy nations and a majority of poorer 
countries with limited access to needed health resources. 
Under this current paradigm, it is unclear how much 
the developing world will benefi t in practice from new 
medications and vaccines. 
Inequality extends ethical challenges to 
therapeutic innovation
The immediate use of untried experimental medicines 
has led to a pressing ethical debate on how to best allocate 
the use of ZMapp. Questions have been raised about why 
the very limited stock was at fi rst only given to two US 
citizens and a Spanish citizen, and not to affected people 
resident in West Africa.14,15 Deploying untested products 
among vulnerable patients in impoverished nations and 
communities recalls a long history of non-consensual, ex-
ploitive drug trials. Ineffective or harmful treatments (as 
may prove to be the case for ZMapp) would risk a costly 
breakdown of trust in health care workers and public 
health programs. The report of an ethics panel, hastily 
convened by the WHO — without representatives from 
West Africa — to advise on these issues underscores the 
ethical challenges that result from social disparity when 
confronting experimental interventions in emergency 
contexts. These challenges include the question of who 
might authorise the use of experimental treatments — for 
instance, the Liberian government did not approve the 
investigational use of drugs.16
Comparison of the failure of market incentives to 
produce widely available and effi cacious drugs via the 
pharmaceutical industry with the success of preserving 
the biosecurity interests of IMF and G20 member nations 
reveals a disturbing feature of neoliberal policy making 
on a global scale. These policies have resulted in privil-
eging the economic and security interests of the nations 
developing the policies — including Australia — while 
disempowering those of poor countries and governments.
Infrastructure and the ethics of containment
Development of effective vaccines and treatments is 
crucial. However, health care and social infrastructure, 
resources and behaviour — much more than virulence 
— determine the extent of mortality and morbidity in 
an outbreak. We know the importance of health infra-
structure and proven and inexpensive infection control 
measures in containing EVD.5 But market-privileging 
economic and social policies, imposed on West African 
nations to secure Western economic interests, have eroded 
needed physical and social infrastructure over decades.3,7 
Governments of poorer countries accepting structural 
adjustment program loans from the IMF and World Bank, 
aiming to increase economic growth, were required to 
introduce austerity measures, transform agriculture to 
focus on export commodity crops, reduce tariffs and al-
low foreign investment. Public infrastructure in disrepair, 
undercutting of rural livelihoods and increased food 
insecurity have resulted.17,18
In these circumstances, preventing and containing 
infectious disease outbreaks is very diffi cult. Most ex-
perts cite a lack of even basic sanitary facilities, sterile 
needles, personal protective equipment and other health 
infrastructure. Once the disease had spread into dense 
urban areas and across four nations, the resources of 
governments and non-government organisations, such 
as Médecins Sans Frontières, were stretched beyond 
capacity.19
Even former US President Bill Clinton, a proponent of 
free markets, is one of many who have acknowledged 
the devastating impact of IMF and World Bank policies 
on agricultural sectors in Africa and their fl ow-on effects 
on social stability, infrastructure and health.20 The recent 
EVD outbreak and the responses to it have not developed 
inevitably but in circumstances intricately linked to the 
economic and political interests of resource-rich nations 
like Australia.3,5,7
The international public health response to EVD is 
humanitarian in focus. But it too is structurally insepa-
rable from the political and economic determinants of the 
outbreak.21 The WHO-coordinated best-practice contain-
ment efforts — including advocacy for local health infra-
structure and respectful, sensitive partnerships with local 
healers and communities — has met with some success.22 
However, the International Health Regulations, which 
govern WHO disease management and response, are part 
of the security agenda identifi ed by Lakoff,13 in which 
expensive surveillance systems and response teams are 
given priority over investment in local disease preven-
tion and public health infrastructure.23,24 Meanwhile, aid 
money remains explicitly within what wealthy nations 
term “international development” — a process that im-
poses their economic priorities on local populations.18
Containment, culture and economics
Western media depict African culture, rather than the 
absence of basic health services and diagnostic labora-
tories, as a major barrier to containment.3 Traditional 
burial practices are seen to facilitate EVD transmission; 
likewise, superstitious, ineffectual traditional medicines 
are perceived to promote risky exposure and/or behavi-
our conducive to EVD spread. Specifi c cultural practices 
are not unimportant, but structural determinants have 
a much greater overall impact, especially in the crucial 
early stages when the outbreak spread so widely. Culture 
has not proven to be such a barrier to containment in 
the past.3,19 In Nigeria, standard control measures, such 
as patient isolation, personal protective equipment and 
hospital hygiene, have successfully limited the outbreak 
so far to 12 people.22
In a global response to EVD, research and development 
of effective drugs should not be the only or even the domi-
nant strategy; EVD can be prevented and contained by 
standard public health sanitary and hygiene measures.2 
Investing in better health services is in the interests of all 
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West Africans and would be a longer lasting and more 
effective use of money. This would enable a swift response 
to this or any other infectious disease outbreak — and, 
globally, that would be in all our interests.
Though seemingly far removed from Australia, the 
West African outbreak of EVD has two lessons for us. 
At the international level, Australia, as a member nation 
of the IMF and soon-to-be host of the G20, has a role in 
the effects of neoliberal policies, including the structural 
adjustment programs in West Africa and in our own 
region. Australia has a responsibility to ensure its repre-
sentatives are not pursuing economic or security interests 
that leave developing nations vulnerable to devastating 
disease risks.
At a domestic, more tangible level, this outbreak re-
minds us that Australia needs to maintain the strength 
of its own public health infrastructure and access to pri-
mary care. This requires the Australian Government to 
invest in, rather than make cuts to, social services, and 
to maintain public funding for research into areas that 
commercial interests do not pursue. For example, the 
recent proposal to cut funding to the CSIRO25 is troubling, 
as these structural shifts in research funding allocation 
could have signifi cant long-term impacts on the com-
munity’s health. It is not so much the fear and chaos 
of an EVD outbreak that should worry us but the more 
mundane policy decisions that occur behind closed doors.
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